时  间： 2020年4月8日 14:00-15:30

线上平台： 腾讯会议

主  题： Debt equity swap and restructuring of sovereign debt

论文摘要：

The paper deals with debt restructuring strategy when the incentive problem of the defaulting nation and clash between the old and new creditors over status of seniority create impasse in sovereign debt renegotiation problems. We show that debt-equity swap where old creditors give up debt claims and swaps it for equity increases the expected pay-off of all stakeholders. The effect comes in two folds. Firstly, the exchange of old debt into equity makes the new debt automatically more senior. The enhanced priority of the new debt allows the lender to charge a lower default premium and increases the pay-off to the borrowing country. Secondly, when the old creditors give up debt claim, they essentially give up cash flow right and seniority attached with the debt claim. Cash flow right is compensated by the payment of equity. To compensate the loss of seniority, some form of issuers’ commitments can be attached, e.g. commitment of resources. The commitment will soften the incentive constraint and increases the welfare of the borrowing country. Furthermore, this study highlights the role of commitment by the sovereign countries to honour their promised payment of newly issued contingent securities to all financiers.

主讲人简介：

王子龙，金融学博士，英国剑桥大学土地经济系高级研究员。主要研究领域包括债务重组，合约理论，公司金融以及房地产金融。    

                                                                                                                                                  金融学院