题目: "To Score or Not to Score? Estimates of a Sponsored Search Auction Model"
主讲人：Matthew Shou-Chung Shum（California Institute of Technology,中国人民大学汉青经济与金融研究院）
时间：2015年7月2日（周四）下午2:00
地点：国际经管学院会议室（诚明楼三层）
主办方：国际经济管理学院

Abstract: We estimate a structural model of a sponsored search auction model. To accommodate the “position paradox”, we relax the assumption of decreasing click volumes with position ranks, which is often assumed in the literature. Using data from “Website X”, one of the largest online marketplaces in China, we find that merchants of different qualities adopt different bidding strategies: high quality merchants bid more aggressively for informative keywords, while low quality merchants are more likely to be sorted to the top positions for vague keywords. Counterfactual evaluations show that the price trend becomes steeper after moving to a score-weighted generalized second price auction, with much higher prices obtained for the top position but lower prices for the other positions. Overall there is only a very modest change in total revenue from introducing popularity scoring, despite the intent in bid scoring to reward popular merchants with price discounts.

报告人简介：Matthew Shou-Chung Shum教授现为加州理工大学(California Institute of Technology)人文与社会学部教授、中国人民大学汉青经济与金融高级研究院院长。Matthew1992年在哥伦比亚大学获得经济学学士学位，1998年在斯坦福大学获得经济学博士学位。Matthew的研究兴趣包括产业组织、理论计量以及产业组织理论的经验分析。Matthew在经济学一流期刊发表论文40余篇，包括top5经济学期刊American Economic Review(2篇)、 Econometrica(3篇)、Journal of Political Economy(1篇)、Review of Economic Studies(2篇)，以及其他经济学子领域顶尖期刊如Journal of Econometrics、Journal of Public Economics、RAND Journal of Economics、Journal of Economic Theory、International Economic Review等。他现在还是Management Science的领域主编和International Economic Review的副主编。