题目: Asset Substitution and Underinvestment: A Dynamic View
主讲人: 巨能久
时间：2015年11月25日（周三）下午1:30
地点：国际经管学院会议室（诚明楼三层）
主办方：国际经济管理学院
摘要:
Asset substitution and underinvestment are two of the most discussed agency problems in finance. However, the empirical study by Graham and Harvey (2001) finds little evidence that corporate executives are concerned about the asset substitution and underinvestment problems when they make investment and financing decisions. This paper notices that the two problems are formulated based on one-shot relationships between equity holders and debt holders. The paper examines these two issues in multi-period dynamic arrangements. It is found that if a firm issues debt only once, then the firm has an incentive to increase the firm risk after the debt is in place. If a firm needs to issue debt periodically, however, in order to capture the tax benefit associated with all future debts, the firm may not have an incentive to increase its risk. It is also found that the underinvestment problem can be greatly reduced or even essentially eliminated in a dynamic model because undertaking an investment now benefits equity holders in the future.
主讲人简介：巨能久，上海交通大学上海高级金融学院金融学教授。主要研究方向为金融工程。
