题目： Maxmin Implementation through Mixed Equilibria
报告人：Zhiwei Liu(Assistant Professor, ISEM/CUEB)
报告时间：2016年10月20日（周四） 1：30 pm
地点：国际经管学院会议室（诚明楼三层）
主办方：国际经济管理学院
Abstract:
In an environment that has at least three players and satisfies Economic, mixed maxmin incentive compatibility and mixed maxmin monotonicity are necessary and sufficient for a social choice set to be fully maxmin implementable in mixed strategies. Our incentive compatibility and monotonicity notions differ from Serrano and Vohra's (2010) Bayesian incentive compatibility and mixed Bayesian monotonicity respectively. It follows that adding ambiguity can make non-implementable social choice sets fully implementable. Also, we present a series of examples to show that under maxmin preferences, our incentive compatibility and monotonicity notions are stronger than the incentive compatibility and monotonicity conditions for full implementation in pure strategies. This confirms the intuition that under maxmin preferences, allowing mixed strategies creates more ways to cheat, and therefore makes full implementation harder.
Biography:
Zhiwei Liu is an Assistant Professor of economics at ISEM/CUEB. For more information, please refer to
