题目：Two-Sided Matching with Appointment Schedule

报告人：Chia-Ling Hsu (Assistant Professor, Kyushu University)

报告时间：2016年10月26日（周三） 1：30 pm

地点：国际经管学院会议室（诚明楼三层）
主办方：国际经济管理学院

Abstract:

This paper studies a two-sided many-to-many matching problem, where agents on the opposite sides need to schedule for appointments. A unique feature in this model is that if an agent uses a time slot for an appointment with another agent on the other side, that time slot cannot be used for meeting any other agents. An example is the interview schedule between junior economists and potential employers in the ASSA meeting. I show the existence of a stable matching. Moreover, I show that the number of agents on the opposite side that an agent is matched with may be different in different stable matchings. Surprisingly, when this problem is formulated with the matching with contracts framework, the choice functions may not be bilaterally substitutable or weakly substitutable, which are the weakest sufficient condition and necessary condition (in the sense of maximum domain) known in the literature, respectively.

Biography:

Chia-Ling Hsu is an Assistant Professor of Innovative Market Design Research Center at Kyushu University. His research interests are in Microeconomics, Market Design, Matching Theory, Industrial Organization.