会议时间：2021/11/03 16:00-17:30

会议主题：Can skilled experts in BOD ensure better Governance? Roles of Incentives and Reputation   

会议地点：向东楼304

内容提要：The paper demonstrates that a highly skilled board capable of acquiring relatively more precise information not only mitigates agency costs but also deters collusion between the board and the CEO. To ensure proper corporate governance, firms must design both incentive contracting and probabilistic renewals of skilled board members' length of tenures which help them build a reputation for honest, truthful and transparent disclosures of news. We show that the expert's skills to obtain accurate information for advising CEO and her reputation for honesty to disseminate them are positively correlated. An experienced and skilled board member creates assortative matching with a CEO with lower agency costs. Together, they help increase firm value via an information-based selection of profitable projects and restructuring of unprofitable ones. Reputable experts enjoy more significant lifetime earnings, have longer-term relationships with firms and contribute to corporate governance inside the firm by creating an atmosphere of  transparency and truthful disclosures of information at lower costs. 

主讲人信息：Sanjay Banerji现任英国诺丁汉大学金融学教授、诺丁汉商学院金融系主任。主要研究领域为公司金融以及公司治理。 多篇文章发表于 Journal of Finance, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Journal of Financial Services Research, Economics Letters 等期刊上。